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Abstract :   
It is often said that English law does not impose “remedial” constructive trusts because it is manifestly 
inappropriate and fundamentally unjustified to impose trusts through the exercise of judicial discretion 
and with retrospective effect. This paper observes the definitional deficiencies in this understanding, and 
reanalyses constructive trusts in terms of the rights which they give effect to. This understanding reveals 
that English law sets its face against the exercise of discretion in relation only to some “remedial” 
constructive trusts and not others, and that the perceived difficulties with remedial constructive trusts are 
often exaggerated. It ends by noting some crucial implications of the reanalysis for the future development 
of the law. 
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 I. INTRODUCTION  
 
It is often said that English law recognises only “institutional” constructive trusts, and 
does not impose “remedial” constructive trusts. Whatever the position in other 
Commonwealth jurisdictions, many English jurists perceive the imposition of trusts 
which reflect the “critical features of judicial discretion and retrospectivity”1 as manifestly 
inappropriate and fundamentally unjustified. The fervency with which this view is often 
asserted gives the impression that “institutional” and “remedial” constructive trusts have 
non-contentious, well-settled meanings. However, upon close inspection, “many judges 
and jurists have used the expression ‘institutional’ without explaining its import, while 
those who have paused to clarify the matter have tended to use the term in quite 
different ways”.2 And in relation to remedial constructive trusts, little time has been spent 
to account for the different degrees and dimensions of discretion, or to investigate 
whether the timing at which a constructive trust takes effect necessarily determines its 
nature.  
This paper observes the definitional deficiencies in the present understanding of 
“institutional” and “remedial” constructive trusts, and reanalyses constructive trusts in 
terms of the rights which they give effect to. In the light of this understanding, the status 
of English law and the credibility of the antagonistic attitude will be revisited. It will be 
seen that English law sets its face against the exercise of discretion in relation only to 
                                                                    
*  Lecturer in Law, University College London. Versions of this paper were presented at the “Modern Studies in the 
Law of Trusts and Wealth Management” conference at the Supreme Court of Singapore in July 2015 and the Property 
and Trusts/Restitution subjects combined session of the SLS Annual Conference at the University of York in 
September 2015. I am grateful to those present for their stimulating discussions. I also thank Charles Mitchell for his 
comments on an earlier draft. 
1 London Allied Holdings Ltd. v Lee [2007] EWHC 2061 (Ch) at [273]; Crossco No. 4 Unlimited v Jolan Ltd. [2011] EWCA 
Civ 1619 at [84]. 
2 Craig Rotherham, Proprietary Remedies in Context (Oxford 2002), 13. 
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some “remedial” constructive trusts and not others, and that the perceived difficulties 
with remedial constructive trusts are often exaggerated. This paper ends by observing 
some crucial implications of the reanalysis for the future development of the law. 
 
 
II. DEFINITIONAL DEFICIENCIES 
 
It is well known that the distinction between institutional and remedial constructive 
trusts can be traced back to 1922 when Roscoe Pound first distinguished between 
“remedial” and “substantive” constructive trusts.3 Yet, although the distinction prevails 
almost a century later, a precise definition of these terms remains elusive.  
 
A. Definitions 
 
Institutional constructive trusts are commonly understood as trusts which are imposed 
without the exercise of judicial discretion. Two related points are often cited in support 
of this view. First, they are created by, and arise from, the occurrence of pre-defined 
facts or real-world events4 relating to “the conduct of the parties”.5 Secondly, these real-
world events are pre-defined in accordance with settled principles, and therefore there is 
no room for the exercise of judicial discretion. 6  In terms of timing, institutional 
constructive trusts are said to arise “automatically”7 from the occurrence of those pre-
defined facts, leaving the court the role merely of declaring that such a trust had arisen in 
the past. 8  As a result, the consequences which flow from the recognition of an 
institutional constructive trust, in particular its potentially detrimental effects on third 
parties, are said to be “mandatory”:9 they are the mere upshots of the events which 
trigger the trusts’ existence.10  
 In contrast, the imposition of remedial constructive trusts is understood to be at 
the discretion of the judge, who has liberty to consider whether or not to create new 
property rights on a case-by-case basis.11 The exercise of discretion is guided only by 
whether it is “just” to impose a constructive trust in a particular case.12 Hence, it is 
impossible to predict in advance whether a constructive trust will be awarded, and 
claimants are said to have “no rights born of any facts which have happened outside the 
court”. 13  Since courts can impose these trusts “without … having to satisfy any 
                                                                    
3 Roscoe Pound, “The Progress of the Law 1918 – 1919” (1920) 33 Harv. L.R. 420, 420-21. The term “institutional” 
was substituted for “substantive” in R.H. Maudsley, “Proprietary Remedies for the Recovery of Money” (1959) 75 
L.Q.R. 234, 237. 
4 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington L.B.C. [1996] A.C. 669, 714. See too Donovan D.M. Waters, Mark 
Gillen, and Lionel Smith, Waters’ Law of Trusts in Canada, 4th ed., (Toronto 2012), 508.  
5 The Right Hon Millett L.J., “Equity — The Road Ahead” (1995 – 1996) 6 K.C.L.J. 1, 18. 
6 Millett, “Equity — The Road Ahead”, p. 18, Lord Neuberger, “The Remedial Constructive Trust — Fact or Fiction”, 
speech at the Banking Services and Finance Law Association Conference, Queenstown, 10 August 2014 
<http://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-140810.pdf>, [27]. 
7 Neuberger, “The Remedial Constructive Trust — Fact or Fiction”, para. [7], Millett, “Equity — The Road Ahead”, p. 
18. 
8 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington L.B.C. [1996] A.C. 669, 714. See too Fortex Group Ltd. v MacIntosh [1998] 
3 N.Z.L.R. 171, 172. 
9 Commonwealth Reserves v Chodar [2001] 2 N.Z.L.R. 374 at [19]. 
10 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington L.B.C. [1996] A.C. 669, 714. 
11 Crossco No. 4 Unlimited v Jolan Ltd. [2011] EWCA Civ 1619 at [84]; Turner v Jacob [2006] EWHC 1317 (Ch) at [85]; 
Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington L.B.C. [1996] A.C. 669, 714. 
12 Neuberger, “The Remedial Constructive Trust — Fact or Fiction”, para. [28], Millett, “Equity — The Road Ahead”, 
p. 18, Lynton Tucker, Nicholas le Poidevin, and James Brightwell (eds), Lewin on Trusts, 19th ed., (London 2015), [7-
026]. 
13 Peter Birks, “Three Kinds of Objection to Discretionary Remedialism” (2000) 29 University of Western Australia 
Law Review 1, 6. 
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established or elucidated rules and requirements”,14 their imposition would reflect the 
absence of a “rationale for the availability of proprietary remedies”.15 In terms of timing, 
the perceived relevance of discretion means that remedial constructive trusts necessarily 
exist for the first time when they are imposed by the court.16 The effects of the trusts are 
also said to be within the discretion of the court.  Thus, judges have latitude to decide 
whether the proprietary consequences take effect retrospectively or prospectively.17 
 
B. Deficiencies 
 
Upon close scrutiny, these definitions do not fully account for the distinction between 
institutional and remedial constructive trusts, and fail accurately to reflect the true state 
of the law. 
 Take first the element of discretion. It is difficult to accept the proposition that the 
exercise of judicial discretion necessarily entails that constructive trusts do not have 
proprietary effect from the occurrence of certain facts. Nor is it necessarily the case that 
the exercise of such discretion indicates the lack of settled principles and proper 
rationales. As Etherton J (as he then was) observed in London Allied Holdings Ltd. v Lee,18 
such a view of judicial discretion may be “overly emphatic, having regard, for example, to 
the strong discretion in the Court to decide upon the appropriate form of relief for 
proprietary estoppel, including whether it should be personal or proprietary and whether 
it should be to protect the claimant’s expectations or compensate for reliance loss.” A 
claimant (A) in proprietary estoppel obtains an “equity by estoppel”19 when B induces A 
to assume that B will cede an interest in property B owns to A, and A relies on the 
assumption to A’s detriment. This indicates that proprietary estoppel undoubtedly gives 
effect to A’s right born of facts which have happened outside the court. Moreover, the 
remedial discretion cannot be exercised simply based on whether it is “just” to do so on 
the facts of a particular case, but must reflect settled and established principles. Thus, the 
remedy must be proportionate, and courts must impose only the “minimum equity” to 
do justice20 to compensate A for his detrimental reliance.21 Where a constructive trust is 
awarded, its proprietary consequences “ha[ve] effect from the time the equity arises” 
(that is, from the occurrence of the relevant facts) “as an interest capable of binding 
successors in title.”22  
 The source of the difficulty lies in the manifest unsuitability of using discretion per 
se as a distinguishing criterion. In a different context, it has been said that “‘discretion’ is 
a somewhat protean word. It connotes the exercise of judgment in making choices. In a 
sense, most decisions involve the exercise of discretion … [T]here can also be discretion 
even in the hammering of a nail”.23 Discretion is not a binary, all-or-nothing concept; 
there are different degrees and shades to it. It is therefore impossible properly to define 
institutional and remedial constructive trusts merely in terms of whether discretion is or 
                                                                    
14 Andrew Butler (ed.), Equity and Trusts in New Zealand, 2nd ed., (Wellington 2009), [13.3.1]. 
15 Millett, “Equity — The Road Ahead”, p. 19. See too Re Goldcorp Exchange Ltd. (in receivership) [1995] 1 A.C. 74, 104. 
16 Re Polly Peck International plc (in administration) No. 2 [1998] 3 All E.R. 812, 830; Re Sharpe (a bankrupt) [1980] 1 W.L.R. 
219, 225. See too Fortex Group Ltd. v MacIntosh [1998] 3 N.Z.L.R. 171, 175; Commonwealth Reserves v Chodar [2001] 2 
N.Z.L.R. 374, 383. 
17 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington L.B.C. [1996] A.C. 669, 714-15; Muschinski v Dodds (1985) 160 C.L.R. 
583, 451. 
18 London Allied Holdings Ltd. v Lee [2007] EWHC 2061 (Ch) at [274]. 
19 Land Registration Act 2002, s. 116(a). 
20 Henry v Henry [2010] UKPC 3 at [65]; Crabb v Arun District Council [1976] Ch. 179, 198. 
21 See e.g. Campbell v Griffin [2001] EWCA Civ 990; Jennings v Rice [2002] EWCA Civ 159; Ottey v Grundy [2003] EWCA 
Civ 1176; Henry v Henry [2010] UKPC 3. 
22 Land Registration Act 2002, s. 116(a). This section merely confirms what was already the norm: see Law Com. No. 
271.  
23 Carty v London Borough of Croydon [2005] EWCA Civ 19, [2005] E.L.R. 104 at [25]. 
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is not exercised. 
 The element of timing also fares no better. In the first place, it is not an essential 
characteristic of remedial constructive trusts that it gives judges the ability to determine 
on a case-by-case basis the timing at which proprietary effects first arise. For instance, 
the Canadian Supreme Court in Rawluk v Rawluk held that remedial constructive trusts 
are “deemed to have arisen at the time when the unjust enrichment first occurred”.24 
Thus, remedial constructive trusts in Canada remain “remedial” in nature even though 
they invariably have retrospective effect. It might then be suggested that remedial 
constructive trusts should be confined to such “backdated” trusts, but this view causes 
even more confusion. Thus, Lord Neuberger has recently suggested that “remedial” 
constructive trusts which are of retrospective effect are in reality “imposed at once as an 
institutional trust”.25 Yet, confining “remedial” constructive trusts only to its prospective 
effect robs the trusts of much of their content. As Peter Birks has argued, such “trusts” 
amount to no more than mere orders for specific delivery of an asset, a jurisdiction 
already inherent in the common law.26 
 
C. Senses of “Remedy” 
 
A significant factor which influences one’s definition of “institutional” and 
“remedial” constructive trusts is one’s understanding of what a remedy entails. This 
is obvious from various judicial observations. For instance, the oft-quoted 
observation by Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington 
L.B.C. states that “[a] remedial constructive trust … is a judicial remedy …”;27 Nourse 
L.J. has defined a remedial constructive trust as “an order of the court granting, by 
way of a remedy, a proprietary right …”;28 and Lewison J observed that remedial 
constructive trusts are situations where “the court will impose a constructive trust by 
way of a remedy”.29 
 Given its centrality to the debate, it is curious that the meaning of “remedy” is 
left unexplained. It appears that “remedy” is used in this context simply to refer to 
the exercise of remedial discretion at the date of judgment, in contradistinction to a 
mere “declaration” of the claimant’s pre-existing property right. However, this does 
not overcome the difficulties associated with the element of discretion, as discussed 
earlier. Moreover, Birks has explained that there are at least five possible meanings of 
the word “remedy”,30 and without identifying which of these is at play, it remains 
impossible properly to distinguish between institutional and remedial constructive 
trusts. In fact, without first identifying what a “remedy” means, there is a real 
possibility that the phrase “remedial constructive trusts” might even be taken to refer 
to legal devices that are not trusts at all. For example, in a recent paper by Bruce 
Collins Q.C.,31 that phrase was equated with a personal liability to account in the 
context of accessory liability, since, on one reading, a “remedy” is “nothing more 
                                                                    
24 Rawluk v Rawluk [1990] 1 S.C.R. 70, 92. See too Re Polly Peck International plc (in administration) No. 2 [1998] 3 All E.R. 
812, 823; Crossco No. 4 Unlimited v Jolan Ltd. [2011] EWCA Civ 1619 at [84]. 
25 Neuberger, “The Remedial Constructive Trust — Fact or Fiction”, at pata. [15]. This led Lord Neuberger to 
question whether “remedial” constructive trusts imposed by the Australian courts are in fact “institutional” in nature: 
ibid., at para. [22]. 
26 Peter Birks, “The End of the Remedial Constructive Trust?” (1998) 4 T.L.I. 202, 205–6.  
27 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington L.B.C. [1996] A.C. 669, 714 (emphasis added). 
28 Re Polly Peck International plc (in administration) No. 2 [1998] 3 All E.R. 812, 830 (emphasis added). 
29 Ultraframe (UK) Ltd. v Fielding [2005] EWHC 1638 (Ch) at [1515] (emphasis added). 
30 Birks, “Three Kinds of Objection to Discretionary Remedialism”, 3–6. See too Rafal Zakrzewski, Remedies Reclassified 
(Oxford 2009), chs. 2–4. 
31 Bruce Collins Q.C., “The Remedial Constructive Trust ‘Between a Trust and a Catch-Phrase’” (2014) 10 Trusts & 
Trustees 1055, 1058. 
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than a formula for equitable relief”.32 As the Supreme Court has recently confirmed, 
however, accessory liability makes the defendant liable “as if he were a trustee”,33 
whereas the subject matter at hand — constructive trusts — involve making the 
defendant a trustee properly so-called. 
 
 
III. RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 
 
In spite of their instability, the elements of discretion and timing persistently find 
themselves at the heart of the discussion. The tendency to focus on these elements 
reveals an underlying desire to understand the different sources of constructive trusts. It is 
suggested that a more precise and structured response to this desire is to explore how 
constructive trusts as remedies relate to the claimant’s rights.34 The term “remedy” is taken 
simply to refer to an order of the court,35 which is “the core meaning of the term … 
most commonly expressly adopted by those who write on remedies.” 36  On this 
understanding, a “constructive trust” is simply the subject matter of a court order, no 
more and no less. This leaves open the questions of what rights trigger the trusts and how 
the trusts relate to those rights. The answers to these questions require an analysis of 
how constructive trusts, as remedies, relate to the parties’ rights and duties.  
 This section lays the groundwork for such an analysis by exploring the relationship 
between rights and remedies in private law.  
 
A. Primary and Secondary Rights 
 
While there are various ways in which private law remedies might be analysed,37 one 
particularly powerful method is to understand whether and how remedies give effect to 
the claimant’s substantive (primary or secondary) rights. 
 The distinction between primary and secondary rights was first made in English 
jurisprudence by John Austin in his lectures. According to Austin, primary rights are 
rights that exist “in and per se”; secondary rights “arise out of violations of primary 
rights”.38 Where A has a primary right against B, B owes a primary duty towards A which 
does not arise from a wrong. The primary right and duty make up a legal relationship 
between A and B which does not hinge on B committing a breach of a duty. On the 
other hand, when B commits a civil wrong by breaching a primary duty,39 A obtains a 
secondary right against B. 
 
B. Types of Remedies 
 
                                                                    
32 Paragon Finance plc v DB Thakerar & Co. [1999] 1 All E.R. 400, 409. 
33 Williams v Central Bank of Nigeria [2014] UKSC 10 at [80] (emphasis in original). 
34 Where A has a right against B, B has a correlative or equivalent duty towards A: Walter Wheeler Cook (ed), Wesley 
Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, reprint ed., (New Jersey 2010) 36, 38. 
We can therefore speak of rights and duties interchangeably. 
35 An “order” includes “judgments, decrees, orders, and pronouncements”: Zakrzewski, Remedies Reclassified, p. 44. 
36 Zakrzewski, Remedies Reclassified, p. 17. See e.g. W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 1st ed., (London 
1768) vol. 3, 396; Birks, “Three Kinds of Objection to Discretionary Remedialism”, p. 5; and the cases and 
commentators cited in Zakrzewski, Remedies Reclassified, pp. 17 and 44.  
37 For an overview of the different analyses commonly made, see Donal Nolan and Andrew Robertson, “Rights and 
Private Law” in Donal Nolan and Andrew Robertson (eds.), Rights and Private Law (Oxford 2014), 18–21. 
38 R. Campbell (ed.), John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence, 5th ed., (London 1885), 762. Hohfeld, too, was of the view 
that, quite apart from a primary right/duty relationship, a new, secondary right/duty relation arises when a primary 
right is infringed: see discussion in Nolan and Robertson, “Rights and Private Law”, p. 19. 
39 See generally James Edelman, Gain-Based Damages: Contract, Tort, Equity and Intellectual Property (Oxford 2002), 32–63. 
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1. Replicative Remedies 
 
When courts enforce A’s primary right directly, the range of potential remedial responses 
is narrow and limited.40 Discretion is neither exercised over the goal nor content of the 
awarded remedy, the former involving the making of policy choices which dictate the 
purpose or object of the remedy and the latter involving the selection of the manner of 
realising its goal.41 The absence of such discretion reflects the fact that these remedies are 
logically restricted to compelling B to carry out his primary duty: it give A “the very thing 
to which he or she is entitled.”42 For instance, in actions for a contractual debt due43 or 
actions by a beneficiary to hold a trustee liable to account for trust property,44 courts are 
concerned solely with compelling the debtor or trustee to carry out his primary duty: the 
awarded remedy simply restates the parties’ rights and duties as revealed in their contract 
or trust instrument. It also follows that B need not be shown to have breached the 
contract or trust, and issues of causation, remoteness, and mitigation of loss do not arise.  
Given that they simply restate and replicate primary rights, remedies which 
enforce primary rights can be labelled “replicative” remedies.45 
 
2. Reflective Remedies 
 
To obtain a remedy which gives effect to A’s secondary right, B’s breach of duty is a 
necessary ingredient of the cause of action in question. Where B’s breach causes A to 
suffer loss, issues of causation, remoteness and mitigation become relevant,46 and A can 
be (and often is) awarded damages as a remedy. This can be seen, for instance, in actions 
for damages following a breach of contract47 and actions against a trustee for negligently 
investing trust property.48 The breach of contract or trust must be proved and shown to 
have caused a loss, and the breaching party will only be liable for losses which are not 
too remote. 
In contrast to primary rights, secondary rights provide for a wider remedial 
potential49 since, in principle, there is no logical restriction to the plethora of possible 
methods by which B’s breach of his primary duty can be corrected. This is not to 
downplay the significance of the doctrine of precedent, which demands that like cases 
are to be treated alike, and which significantly diminishes the ability to reconsider an 
established precedent where the precedent was set by a higher court. But the doctrine of 
precedent applies regardless of the type of remedy in question.50 The point presently 
                                                                    
40 Peter Birks, “Equity in the Modern Law: An Exercise in Taxonomy” (1996) 26 University of Western Australia Law 
Review 1, 14. 
41 Paul Finn, “Equitable Doctrine and Discretion in Remedies” in W.R. Cornish, Richard Nolan, Janet O’Sullivan et al 
(eds.), Restitution Past, Present and Future (Oxford 1998), 268–70.  
42 Nolan and Robertson, “Rights and Private Law”, p. 20. 
43 White and Carte (Councils) Ltd. v McGregor [1962] A.C. 413. 
44 Sir P. Millett, “Equity’s Place in the Law of Commerce” (1998) 114 L.Q.R. 214, 225–27. Apparently, a different 
approach is taken in relation to cases involving bare commercial trusts: AIB Group (UK) plc v Mark Redler & Co. Solicitors 
[2014] UKSC 58 at [70], [106]; but see J.E. Penner, “Falsifying the Trust Account and Compensatory Equitable 
Compensation” in Simone Degeling and Jason Varuhas (eds), Equitable Compensation and Disgorgement of Profit (Oxford 
2016). 
45 Zakrzewski, Remedies Reclassified, p. 55. Zakrzewski also labels remedies which give effect to secondary rights as 
“replicative” remedies. This is, however, misguided: see text to note 55 below. 
46 Lionel Smith, “The Measurement of Compensation Claims against Trustees and Fiduciaries” in Elise Bant and 
Matthew Harding (eds.), Exploring Private Law (Cambridge 2010), 373. 
47 Photo Production Ltd. v Securicor Transport Ltd. [1980] A.C. 827, 349. 
48 Charles Mitchell, “Equitable Rights and Wrongs” (2006) 59 C.L.P. 267, 283–84.  
49 Birks, “Equity in the Modern Law: An Exercise in Taxonomy”, p. 12. 
50 Judges also have so-called “discretion” to determine whether a case before the court is sufficiently identical to a 
previous case in order for the previous case to be binding by making factual findings in order to bring cases within, or 
push cases without, the scope of a rule (for a discussion of this point in relation to the family homes context, see Ying 
Khai Liew, “The Secondary-Rights Approach to the ‘Common Intention Constructive Trust’” (2015) 79 Conv. 211, 
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made is that it is inherent in the nature of remedies which give effect to secondary rights 
that they have a remedial potential which is not as logically restricted as those giving 
effect to primary rights. 
It is sometimes thought that A does not obtain a secondary right from the 
moment B infringes A’s primary right. For example, Stephen Smith writes that awards of 
damages do not confirm or affirm an existing duty to pay damages, but are created by 
court orders.51 However, as Allan Beever has noted, the secondary “duty to repair” 
reflects a fundamental right: “[t]here is surely no remedy more basic than the repair of a 
wrong.”52 On the other hand, it is sometimes thought that remedies which give effect to 
secondary rights are indistinguishable from replicative remedies. For example, Rafal 
Zakrzewski says that an award of damages “redresses the non-performance of a secondary 
right to the payment of damages arising from a wrong”,53 and further, that a remedy 
which gives effect to secondary rights “simply restate[s] prior substantive rights”. 54 
However, it is doubtful whether it is ever possible for B properly to discharge his 
secondary duty prior to a court order, since B would not be in a position to determine 
what the appropriate liquidated sum of damages would be. Even if performance were 
attempted, this would not discharge the duty, since “pre-payment is no defence to a 
claim in damages”.55  
Ultimately, a proper analysis calls for a nuanced approach by taking a middle 
ground between the two exaggerated views. The fact that a secondary right is created 
when B breaches A’s primary right is not inconsistent with the view that that right 
already in existence requires liquidation by a court to determine the extent of the remedy, 
taking into account the criterion of remoteness.56 This is reflected in the remedial 
discretion involved: such remedies allow for some discretion as to content to be exercised, 
but do not provide for the exercise of discretion to re-evaluate the goal of the remedy on 
a case-by-case basis. As John Gardner writes, “the secondary obligation is a rational echo 
of the primary obligation, for it exists to serve, so far as may still be done, the reasons for 
the primary obligation that was not performed when its performance was due.”57 In 
addition, as Paul Finn observes, there are doctrines which “suggest what is the goal of 
the remedy but leave it to the “appropriateness” principle to determine the manner of 
that goal’s realisation”.58 So, although remedies which give effect to secondary rights 
provide for a wider remedial potential than replicative remedies, the “remedy is not at 
large.”59  
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
215–16). But such “discretion” also applies regardless of the type of remedy in question, and so has no bearing on the 
present discussion concerning the nature of remedies. 
51 See e.g. Stephen A. Smith, “Duties, Liabilities, and Damages” (2011 – 2012) 125 Harv. L.R. 1727. 
52 Allan Beever, “Our Most Fundamental Rights” in Donal Nolan and Andrew Robertson, “Rights and Private Law” 
in Donal Nolan and Andrew Robertson (eds), Rights and Private Law (Oxford 2014), 81. 
53 Zakrzewski, Remedies Reclassified, pp. 166–67 (emphasis added). 
54 Zakrzewski, Remedies Reclassified, p. 203 (emphasis added). 
55 Stephen Smith, “Why Courts make Orders (And What This Tells us About Damages)” (2011) 64 C.L.P. 51, 74. See 
Edmunds v Lloyds Italico & l”Ancora Compagnia di Assicurazione e Riassicurazione SpA [1986] 1 W.L.R. 492, 496. 
56 The award of replicative remedies in certain contexts may also require an exercise of “liquidation”, for instance 
where A’s right to a contractual debt due is couched in terms of a “reasonable price” (see generally Rafal Zakrzewski, 
“The Nature of a Claim on an Indemnity” (2006) 22 J.C.L 54). But these cases are distinguishable from those presently 
discussed: these cases do not provide courts with any discretion as to the extent to which the defendant will be liable, 
since this is determined by the primary relationship between the parties and all that is left to do is to render certain the 
uncertain term. In particular, no assessment of the remoteness of loss or gain is necessary. 
57 John Gardner, “What is Tort Law For? Part 1: The Place of Corrective Justice” (2011) 30 Law & Philosophy 1, 40. 
See too Robert Stevens, “Rights Restricting Remedies” in Andrew Robertson and Michael Tilbury (eds.), Divergences in 
Private Law (Oxford 2016), 160–61. 
58 Finn, “Equitable Doctrine and Discretion in Remedies”, p. 269. 
59 Finn, “Equitable Doctrine and Discretion in Remedies”, p. 270. 
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In order to reflect the fact that remedies which respond to secondary rights give 
effect to A’s substantive right but nevertheless provide for the exercise of discretion as to 
content, they can be labelled “reflective” remedies.  
 
3. Transformative Remedies 
 
A third category of private law remedies, which can be labelled “transformative” 
remedies, provide for the widest remedial potential. Their imposition creates “a legal 
relation that significantly differs from any legal relation that existed before the court 
order was made”. 60  They transform and substantially alter A’s substantive rights. 61 
Examples of such remedies are an order giving guidance to trustees,62 and a court’s 
ability to allow the recovery of incurred expenses where a contract is discharged due to 
frustration “if it considers it just to do so having regard to all the circumstances of the 
case”.63 One can hardly say that beneficiaries have a substantive right to the particular 
guidance given to their trustees, or that a contracting party has a substantive right to the 
recovery of incurred expenses where the contract is frustrated. 
The transformative nature of these remedies is brought to bear in their provision 
for the exercise of discretion as to both the goal and content of the appropriate remedy. 
Instead of merely replicating or liquidating A’s pre-trial rights, the imposition of a 
transformative remedy requires “many of the policy choices that are entrenched in the 
law relating to substantive rights ... to be reopened.”64 It is therefore usually65 difficult to 
predict in advance whether a transformative remedy will be awarded and (if it is) what its 
content would be. On the other hand, the flexibility of transformative remedies allows 
courts to respond to the sensitivities of the facts of a particular case. 
 
 
IV. REPLICATIVE, REFLECTIVE, AND 
TRANSFORMATIVE CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS 
 
Using the foregoing analytical framework of private law remedies, constructive trusts can 
be understood either as replicative, reflective, or transformative in nature. This section 
observes how a number of different constructive trust doctrines fit within this 
restructured understanding of remedies. 
 
A. Replicative Constructive Trusts 
 
The doctrine in Rochefoucauld v Boustead 66 and secret trusts are examples of doctrines by 
which constructive trusts are imposed as replicative remedies. The former doctrine 
typically involves B informally agreeing to hold A’s land on trust for A, and A acting in 
reliance by transferring the legal title of the land to B. The latter doctrine typically 
involves a testator (A) naming B as apparent legatee in A’s will, with B informally 
agreeing to hold the legacy for the benefit of another (C), and A acting in reliance by 
leaving his will unchanged until his death. In both doctrines, once A acts in reliance on 
                                                                    
60 Zakrzewski, Remedies Reclassified, p. 203. 
61 Zakrzewski, Remedies Reclassified, p. 102. 
62 Chapman v Chapman [1954] A.C. 429, 446. 
63 Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943, s. 1(2). 
64 Zakrzewski, Remedies Reclassified, p. 98. 
65 Again, the doctrine of precedent may constrain the exercise of such discretion in practice, but this does not detract 
from the fact that it is inherent in the nature of transformative remedies that they allow for discretion as to the goal 
and content of the remedy to be exercised. 
66 Rochefoucauld v Boustead [1897] 1 Ch. 196. 
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B’s promise by transferring the property which is the subject matter of the promise to B, 
a constructive trust arises for the benefit of the intended beneficiary when B acquires the 
property. It is under that trust that A (in the context of the Rochefoucauld doctrine) or C 
(in the secret trusts context) acquires the promised interest. 
It is necessary briefly to consider and refute the suggestions some commentators 
have put forward that the constructive trust imposed in these doctrines is a “fiction”,67 
and that the trusts enforced are in fact express in nature.68 As a facilitative device, express 
trusts respond to A’s properly manifested intention to create a trust.69 In relation to the 
doctrines presently discussed, A’s intention to create a trust is never properly manifested, 
usually due to the lack of compliance with certain formality requirements.70 The express 
trusts analysis regrettably entails “disapplying” or ignoring the relevant statutory 
formality requirements. 71  On the other hand, a constructive trust analysis respects 
Parliament’s sovereignty by leaving those provisions intact.72 Furthermore, on the facts 
of some cases, none of the parties involved were able properly to declare an express 
trust; and so the trust enforced by the courts can only properly be analysed as 
constructive in nature.73 It is unsurprising, therefore, that the position taken by the 
majority of commentators74 and the overwhelming weight of authority75 is that the trusts 
in question are constructive in nature. This analysis must be correct. 
In these doctrines, the constructive trust remedy replicates A’s primary right 
which arises from the moment B acquires the property. As replicative remedies, their 
award is not conditional upon B committing a wrong: “his trusteeship is independent of 
and precede[s] the breach of trust”.76 Thus, B incurs custodial duties77 and a duty to 
                                                                    
67 William Swadling, “The Fiction of the Constructive Trust” (2011) 54 C.L.P. 399. 
68 William Swadling, “The Nature of the Trust in Rochefoucauld v Boustead” in Charles Mitchell (ed.), Constructive and 
Resulting Trusts (Oxford 2010). See also Philip H. Pettit, Equity and the Law of Trusts, 11th ed., (Oxford 2009), 98; Paul 
Matthews, “The Words which are Not There: A Partial History of the Constructive Trust” in Mitchell, Constructive and 
Resulting Trusts; J.E. Penner, The Law of Trusts, Core Text Series, 9th ed., (Oxford 2014), [6.10].  
69 Robert Chambers, “Constructive Trusts in Canada” (1999) 37 Alberta Law Review 173, 183. See also Robert 
Chambers, Resulting Trusts (Oxford 1997), 220ff; Peter Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution, ,Revised ed., 
(Oxford 1989), 65.  
70 The relevant statutory formality requirements are: in the context of the doctrine in Rochefoucauld v Boustead, Law of 
Property Act 1925, s. 53(1)(b); in the secret trusts context, Wills Act 1837, s. 9. 
71 Swadling, “The Nature of the Trust in Rochefoucauld v Boustead”, p. 113; Matthews, “The Words which are Not There: 
A Partial History of the Constructive Trust”, p. 89. 
72 Simon Gardner, “Reliance-Based Constructive Trusts” in Mitchell, Constructive and Resulting Trusts, p. 64–65. 
73 Examples of such cases are Rochefoucauld v Boustead [1897] 1 Ch. 196 and De Bruyne v De Bruyne [2010] EWCA Civ 519, 
[2010] 2 F.L.R. 1240. In these cases, no one owned the property absolutely at the outset in order to be capable of 
declaring an express trust over the entire beneficial interest in the property, which was what the ultimate beneficiary 
under the trust was held to be entitled to. For an analysis of this point in relation to the case of Rochefoucauld, see Ying 
Khai Liew, “Rochefoucauld v Boustead” in Charles Mitchell and Paul Mitchell (eds.), Landmark Cases in Equity (Oxford 
2012). This point has recently found approval in Ben McFarlane and Charles Mitchell, Hayton and Mitchell: Text, Cases 
and Materials on the Law of Trusts and Equitable Remedies, 14th ed., (London 2015), para. [15-034]. 
74 See, e.g. G.P. Costigan Jr., “The Classification of Trusts as Express, Resulting, and  Constructive” (1913–14) 27 
H.L.R. 437; T.G. Youdan, “Formalities for Trusts of Land, and the Doctrine in Rochefoucauld v Boustead” (1984) 43 
C.L.J. 306; M.P. Thompson, “Using Statutes as Instruments of Fraud” (1985) 36 N.I.L.Q. 358; Gbolahan Elias, 
Explaining Constructive Trusts (Oxford, 1990), 108; Patricia Critchley, “Instruments of Fraud, Testamentary Dispositions, 
and the Doctrine of Secret Trusts” (1999) 115 L.Q.R. 631; Ben McFarlane, “Constructive Trusts Arising on a Receipt 
of Property Sub Conditione” (2004) 120 L.Q.R. 667; A.J. Oakley, Parker and Mellows: The Modern Law of Trusts, 9th ed., 
(London 2008), [10–273]; Simon Gardner, “Reliance-Based Constructive Trusts” in Mitchell, Constructive and Resulting 
Trusts, p. 68.  
75 In the context of the doctrine in Rochefoucauld v Boustead, see Taylor v Davies [1920] A.C. 636, 650–51; Bannister v 
Bannister [1948] 2 All E.R. 133, 136; Re Densham (A Bankrupt) [1975] 3 All E.R. 726, 732; Chattey v Farndale Holdings Inc 
(1998) 75 P. & C.R. 298, 316; Paragon Finance plc v D.B. Thakerar & Co. [1999] 1 All E.R. 400, 409; Banner Homes Holdings 
Ltd. (formerly Banner Homes Group Plc) v Luff Developments Ltd. [2000] Ch. 372, 383–84; J.J. Harrison (Properties) Ltd. v 
Harrison [2001] EWCA Civ 1467 at [36]; Samad v Thompson [2008] EWHC 2809 (Ch) at [128]; Staden v Jones [2008] 
EWCA Civ 936 at [31]; De Bruyne v De Bruyne [2010] EWCA Civ 519 at [51]; Crossco No. 4 Unlimited v Jolan Ltd. [2011] 
EWCA Civ 1619 at [94]; Groveholt Ltd. v Hughes [2012] EWHC 3351 (Ch) at [14]. In the secret trusts context, see 
Kasperbauer v Griffith [2000] 1 W.T.L.R. 333, 343.  
76 Paragon Finance plc v DB Thakerar & Co. [1999] 1 All E.R. 400, 408. 
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account78 from the moment of acquisition: B’s “assumption to act ... itself”79 gives rise to 
his liability to account for the trust property.  
 
B. Reflective Constructive Trusts 
 
An example of a doctrine providing for the imposition of reflective constructive trusts is 
proprietary estoppel. Proprietary estoppel arises where B induces A to assume (through a 
promise, assurance, or acquiescence in A’s mistaken belief) that B will cede an interest in 
property he owns to A, and A detrimentally relies on the assumption. Guided by the 
notion of the “minimum equity to do justice to the plaintiff”,80 the imposed remedy aims 
to achieve proportionality between A’s detriment and B’s role in inducing it. 81  A 
constructive trust is often imposed, 82  but compensatory damages (or “equitable 
compensation”) may also be awarded.83 The availability of damages where B’s breach 
causes a loss is a “sure test”84 and a “powerful indicator”85 that the remedy is wrong-
based. After all, “‘damages’ means … a monetary award given for a wrong.”86 It follows 
that remedies awarded following a successful proprietary estoppel claim, whether in the 
form of a constructive trust or damages, give effect to A’s secondary right. There must 
therefore be a causal link between B’s promise or assurance and A’s detriment,87 which is 
established when A demonstrates the element of reliance. Rules of remoteness also come 
into play through the application of the “minimum equity” concept, which prevents B 
from being liable for any of A’s detriment which is too remote.  
In explaining the wrong-based analysis, Michael Spence defines the primary duty 
B breaches as a “duty to ensure the reliability of induced assumptions”.88 He writes:89 
 
The primary obligation is that [B] must, in so far as he is reasonably able, prevent 
harm to [A]. “Harm” consists in the extent to which [A] is worse off because the 
assumption has proved unjustified than he would have been had it never been 
induced. The secondary obligation is that, if [A] does suffer harm of the relevant 
type, and [B] might reasonably have prevented it, then [B] must compensate [A] 
for the harm he has suffered. 
 
This provides an explanation for why the elements of assurance or promise, 
reliance, and detriment are required.90 When B induces A to assume that A will obtain an 
interest in B’s property and A relies on that assumption, B incurs a primary duty to 
prevent harm to A by making good B’s expectation. If, however, B refuses to do so, B 
breaches his primary duty, causing A to suffer detriment. A obtains an “equity by 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
77 Banner Homes Group Plc v Luff Developments Ltd. [2000] Ch. 372, 399. This case reflects the doctrine in Pallant v Morgan 
[1953] Ch. 43, which Millett L.J. in Paragon Finance plc v DB Thakerar & Co. [1999] 1 All E.R. 400, 409 also cited as a 
doctrine falling within the same category as the doctrine in Rochefoucauld v Boustead and secret trusts. 
78 Rochefoucauld v Boustead [1897] 1 Ch. 196, 212. 
79 Selangor United Rubber Estates Ltd. v Cradock (No. 3) [1968] 1 W.L.R. 1555 (Ch), 1579. 
80 Crabb v Arun District Council [1976] Ch. 179, 198. 
81 Henry v Henry [2010] UKPC 3 at [65].  
82 Susan Bright and Ben McFarlane, “Proprietary Estoppel and Property Rights” (2005) 64 C.L.J. 449, 458. 
83 Campbell v Griffin [2001] EWCA Civ 990; Jennings v Rice [2002] EWCA Civ 159; Ottey v Grundy [2003] EWCA Civ 
1176; Henry v Henry [2010] UKPC 3. 
84 Andrew Burrows, The Law of Restitution, 3rd ed., (Oxford 2010), 622.  
85 James Edelman, “Equitable Torts” (2002) 10 Torts L.J. 64, text between fns. 56 and 57. 
86 Edelman, Gain-Based Damages, p. 5. 
87 Andrew Robertson, “Estoppels and Rights-Creating Events: Beyond Wrongs and Promises” in Jason W. Neyers, 
Richard Bronaugh, and Stephen G.A. Pitel (eds.), Exploring Contract Law (Oxford 2009), 219; Sean Wilken Q.C. and 
Karim Ghaly, Wilken and Ghaly: The Law of Waiver, Variation, and Estoppel, 3rd ed., (Oxford 2012), [11.53]. 
88 Michael Spence, Protecting Reliance: The Emergent Doctrine of Equitable Estoppel (Oxford 1999), 2.  
89 Spence, Protecting Reliance, p. 2. 
90 Thorner v Major [2009] UKHL 18 at [29]. 
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estoppel” against B, giving A a cause of action in proprietary estoppel. This “equity” 
requires liquidation by a court, following which a proprietary or personal remedy may be 
awarded. The “equity” is “capable of binding B’s successors in title”,91 and thus if a 
constructive trust is determined to be the appropriate remedy, then the proprietary effect 
of such an award is backdated “by virtue of some doctrine of relation back”92 to the time 
of B’s breach.  
 
C. Transformative Constructive Trusts 
 
Commonwealth jurisdictions such as Australia and Canada have explicitly developed a 
“remedial constructive trust” device. This device allows for the award of transformative 
constructive trusts, which provides for the ability to exercise discretion both as to the 
goal and content of the appropriate remedy on a case-by-case basis.  
 
1. Australia 
 
In Australia, courts are able to impose “remedial constructive trusts” to prevent 
unconscionable conduct in a wide array of cases, such as those involving property 
acquired in the course of a de facto marriage,93 estoppel,94 breach of fiduciary duty,95 and 
knowing receipt. 96  The imposition of these trusts unmistakably involves judicial 
discretion. It has repeatedly been said that the constructive trust is to be imposed only as 
a last resort, that is, after other “lesser” — personal — remedies have been considered 
and found to be wanting in a particular case.97 This reflects an exercise of discretion as to 
the content of the appropriate remedy, akin to the “minimum equity” approach taken by 
English courts in relation to proprietary estoppel. Such discretion is also reflected in the 
ability of Australian courts to decide whether the trust will take effect from the date of 
judgment or from some other earlier point in time.98 
The extent of discretion does not stop there, however: courts go further by 
exercising discretion as to the goal of the remedy on a case-by-case basis. This is indicated 
by the open-ended list of potential purposes or objects pursuant to which these trusts 
may be awarded. For instance, “unconscionability” has been defined as a situation which 
the court deems to be “contrary to justice and good conscience”.99 This indicates that 
there is no limit to the potential objects for which the remedy may be awarded, so long 
as courts do not “disregard legal and equitable rights and simply do what is fair”.100 
Similarly, while courts are guided by the “principle of appropriateness” whereby “the 
purpose (or imperatives) served by the individual doctrine” informs a judge in the 
selection of the appropriate remedy,101 there is also “the requirement to do ‘practical 
justice’”, which allows courts to refuse to impose a constructive trust for any policy 
reason. For instance, a judge may be informed by concerns relating to the proportionality 
                                                                    
91 Land Registration Act 2002, s. 116(a). 
92 Kevin Gray and Susan Francis Gray, Elements of Land Law, 5th edn., (Oxford 2009), [9.2.89]. 
93 e.g. Muschinski v Dodds (1985) 160 C.L.R. 583; Baumgartner v Baumgartner (1987) 164 C.L.R. 137. 
94 Giumelli v Giumelli (1999) 196 C.L.R. 101. 
95 Grimaldi v Chameleon Mining NL (No. 2) [2012] F.C.A.F.C. 6. 
96 Robins v Incentive Dynamics Pty Ltd. (in liquidation) [2003] NSWCA 71. Cf. Wambo Coal Pty. Ltd. v Ariff [2007] N.S.W.S.C. 
589 at [42], where it was suggested by White J. that a constructive trust imposed on a mistaken payment where the 
recipient knew of the mistake and still retained the money was an “institutional” trust. 
97 Bathurst C.C. v PWC Properties Pty. Ltd. (1998) 195 C.L.R. 566 at [42]; Giumelli v Giumelli (1999) 196 C.L.R. 101 at [4]; 
John Alexander’s Clubs Pty. Ltd. v White City Tennis Club Ltd. [2010] H.C.A. 19 at [128], Farah Constructions Pty Ltd. v Say-
Dee Pty. Ltd. (2007) 230 C.L.R. 89 at [200]. 
98 Muschinski v Dodds (1985) 160 C.L.R. 583, 451. 
99 Baumgartner v Baumgartner (1987) 76 A.L.R. 75, 83.  
100 Muschinski v Dodds (1985) 160 C.L.R. 583, 436. 
101 Grimaldi v Chameleon Mining NL (No. 2) [2012] F.C.A.F.C. 6 at [505], [509]. 
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of the remedial response,102 the protection of third party creditors who are “materially 
interested” or “directly affected” by the award,103 or the desire to deter the defendant 
from keeping the proceeds of his wrongdoing.104 As Deane J observed in Muschinski v 
Dodds,105 the constructive trust may be “moulded and adjusted to give effect to the 
application and inter-play of equitable principles in the circumstances of the particular 
case.” The clear ability to exercise discretion as to the goal of the appropriate remedy 
indicates that Australian courts impose constructive trusts as transformative remedies.106  
This conclusion is fortified by the rule adopted by the High Court in John 
Alexander’s Clubs Pty Ltd. v White City Tennis Club Ltd. that “where a court is invited to 
make, or proposes to make, orders directly affecting the rights or liabilities of a non-party 
[such as a constructive trust], the non-party is a necessary party and ought to be 
joined.”107 Such third parties are able not only to make a case against the claimant’s 
“substantive case”, but also to argue that the award of a constructive trust remedy would 
unfairly prejudice them. In view of this rule, it is hardly possible to say that courts are 
concerned with replicating or reflecting a claimant’s pre-existing right, since the decision 
whether or not to award a constructive trust hinges on factors which are extraneous to 
considerations relating to the claimant’s rights.  
 
2. Canada 
 
Canadian courts have also developed a so-called “remedial constructive trusts” device, 
which is available in two types of claim, namely unjust enrichment and wrongdoing. 
Unjust enrichment claims are made out when three requirements are satisfied: the 
defendant received an enrichment, the claimant suffered a corresponding deprivation, 
and there is an absence of juristic reason for the enrichment which renders the 
defendant’s retention of the enrichment unjust.108 A wrongdoing claim is made out where 
the defendant is under an equitable obligation in relation to the activities giving rise to 
the assets in his hands, and it is shown that the assets were acquired as a result of the 
defendant’s deemed or actual agency activities in breach of that obligation.109 Such claims 
have arisen in cases relating to the acquisition of property by fraud or breach of fiduciary 
duty.110  
Once an unjust enrichment or wrongdoing claim is made out, courts have 
latitude to exercise discretion in order to determine the appropriate remedy. A 
“minimum equity”-like approach is detected, which indicates the exercise of discretion as 
to content. Thus, personal remedies must be deemed inadequate before a constructive 
trust can be awarded.111  
                                                                    
102 Grimaldi v Chameleon Mining NL (No. 2) [2012] F.C.A.F.C. 6 at [505], [511]. 
103 John Alexander’s Clubs Pty. Ltd. v White City Tennis Club Ltd. [2010] H.C.A. 19 at [131], [139]. 
104 Robins v Incentive Dynamics Pty. Ltd. (in liquidation) [2003] N.S.W.C.A. 71 at [77]. 
105 Muschinski v Dodds (1985) 160 C.L.R. 583, 451. 
106 For this reason, Lord Neuberger’s suggestion that remedial constructive trusts imposed in Australia are in fact 
institutional in nature (noted at n 25 above), is misguided. 
107 John Alexander’s Clubs Pty. Ltd. v White City Tennis Club Ltd. [2010] H.C.A. 19 at [131]–[132]. 
108 Pettkus v Becker [1980] 2 S.C.R. 834, 848; Peter v Beblow [1993] 1 S.C.R. 980, 987; Garland v Consumers” Gas Co. [2004] 1 
S.C.R. 629 at [30]; Kerr v Baranow [2011] 1 R.C.S. 269 at [36]–[45]. It should be noted, however, that this does not entail 
a “pure juristic reasons approach” (see Lionel Smith, “Demystifying Juristic Reasons” (2007) 45 Can. Bus. L.J. 281, 
291) but one where there is a mix between “juristic reasons and reasons for restitution” (Smith, ibid., p. 290). This is 
obvious from the Supreme Court’s decision in Garland (at [44]–[46]). The means by which this element of the claim is 
to be made out is by reference to a list of established categories of juristic reasons; and although the list was said to be 
closed, it remains possible to expand that list by adding “other valid common law, equitable or statutory obligations” 
(Garland at [44]), or by the defendant’s attempt to rebut the claimant’s claim through relying on “the reasonable 
expectations of the parties” or “public policy concerns” (Garland at [46]).   
109 Soulos v Korkontzilas [1997] 2 S.C.R. 217, 241. 
110 Soulos v Korkontzilas [1997] 2 S.C.R. 217, 238. 
111 Rawluk v Rawluk [1990] 1 S.C.R. 70, 107; Peter v Beblow [1993] 1 S.C.R. 980, 988. 
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In addition, however, courts also exercise discretion as to the goal of the 
appropriate remedy. Consider first the cases based on the defendant’s wrongdoing. A 
constructive trust is awarded where the claimant can show a “legitimate reason for 
seeking a proprietary remedy”, and where there are “no factors which would render 
imposition [sic] of a constructive trust unjust in all the circumstances of the case”.112 This 
indicates a non-exhaustive approach to the potentially relevant purposes or objectives to 
be achieved by the awarded remedy. Consider the case of Soulos v Korkontzilas,113 which 
demonstrates the multifarious policy factors which may be taken into account. B was A’s 
real estate broker, who in breach of his fiduciary duty arranged for his (B’s) wife to 
purchase a property which B was meant to acquire on A’s behalf. The majority of the 
Supreme Court held that a constructive trust was the appropriate remedy. In relation to 
the requirement to demonstrate a legitimate reason, this was fulfilled by the fact that the 
property in question held special value to A because the tenant was A’s banker, and 
being the landlord of one’s banker was prestigious in his community.114 The award was 
also justified by the policy aim of “ensur[ing] that agents and others in positions of trust 
remain faithful to their duty of loyalty”.115 In relation to the requirement to demonstrate 
that the imposition of a constructive trust was not “unjust in all the circumstances of the 
case”, the court took into account the fact that undue prejudice would not be caused 
either to B or to any third party.116  
The unjust enrichment cases also reveal an open-ended approach to the goal of 
the awarded remedy, where the constructive trust is used as “a broad and flexible 
equitable tool … to determine beneficial entitlement to property”.117 For a constructive 
trust to be imposed, it is necessary to show some “reason to grant to the plaintiff the 
additional rights that flow from recognition of a right of property”;118 and it appears that 
any relevant policy factor can be taken into account. Among these are: the 
appropriateness of granting the claimant priority in bankruptcy, preventing the 
wrongdoer from retaining any increase in value of the property, the uniqueness of the 
property in question, the moral quality of the defendant’s act,119 the probability of the 
defendant paying up a personal award, 120 and the potential “psychological benefits 
derived from pride of ownership”.121 The discretion to determine the purpose or object 
of the remedy in a particular case indicates that these constructive trusts are 
transformative in nature. 
 
 
V. A RE-ANALYSIS 
 
A few exceptions notwithstanding, 122 judges have repeatedly held that English law 
recognises only “institutional” constructive trusts; it does not impose “remedial” 
                                                                    
112 Soulos v Korkontzilas [1997] 2 S.C.R. 217, 241. See too Sun Indalex Finance v United Steelworkers [2013] 1 S.C.R. 271 
[228]. 
113 Soulos v Korkontzilas [1997] 2 S.C.R. 217. 
114 Soulos v Korkontzilas [1997] 2 S.C.R. 217 at [49]. 
115 Soulos v Korkontzilas [1997] 2 S.C.R. 217 at [50]. 
116 Soulos v Korkontzilas [1997] 2 S.C.R. 217 at [51]. 
117 Kerr v Baranow [2011] 1 R.C.S. 269 at [50]. 
118 LAC Minerals Ltd. v Int Corona Resources Ltd. [1989] 2 S.C.R. 574, 678. 
119 All the above-mentioned points are found in LAC Minerals Ltd. v Int Corona Resources Ltd. [1989] 2 S.C.R. 574 at 
678–79. 
120 Peter v Beblow [1993] 1 S.C.R. 980, 999. 
121 Rawluk v Rawluk [1990] 1 S.C.R. 70, 92. 
122 Metall Und Rohstoff AG v Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette Inc [1990] 1 Q.B. 391, 479; Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v 
Islington L.B.C. [1996] A.C. 669, 716; London Allied Holdings Ltd. v Lee [2007] EWHC 2061 (Ch) at [273]–[274]; Clarke v 
Meadus [2010] EWHC 3117 (Ch) at [82]. 
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constructive trusts.123 By making this observation, these judges are not simply saying that 
English law approaches the award of constructive trusts differently from other 
Commonwealth jurisdictions. Rather, it reflects a much deeper concern, that it is 
unthinkable to award proprietary remedies through the exercise of judicial discretion and 
with retrospective effect.124 To allow such a practice is thought to be unprincipled125 and 
“without recourse to further rationalisation”, 126  since only with the authority of 
Parliament can a court “grant a proprietary right to A, who has not had one beforehand, 
without taking some proprietary right away from B”.127 This reflects two assumptions 
concerning the imposition of constructive trusts in English law: they are ever only 
awarded where judges do not exercise discretion,128 and that the retrospectivity in their 
award necessarily creates uncertainty in the law,129 particularly to the prejudice of third 
parties.  
It is crucial to explore whether these assumptions are valid. To do so 
meaningfully, it is necessary to proceed with an understanding of constructive trusts as 
replicative, reflective, or transformative remedies, in order to avoid the definitional 
difficulties in the current understanding, as discussed above.130  
 
A. “Institutional” Constructive Trusts 
 
Constructive trusts which have traditionally been identified as “institutional” in nature 
square easily with an understanding of these trusts as replicative remedies. In this regard, 
it can be noted that the constructive trusts which were earlier identified as replicative in 
nature — namely those arising in the context of the doctrine in Rochefoucauld v Boustead 
and secret trusts — have also been described in terms which match those commonly 
used to identify institutional constructive trusts. Thus, as Millett L.J. (as he then was) 
observed of these constructive trusts, B’s “possession of the property is coloured from 
the first by the trust and confidence by means of which he obtained it”131 — that is, “as 
the result of a transaction by which both parties intend to create a trust from the 
outset”.132 There is a clear alignment between these constructive trusts and “institutional” 
constructive trusts, which are said to arise “by operation of law as from the date of the 
circumstances which give rise to it”.133  
Moreover, the lack of exercise of remedial discretion in relation to “institutional” 
constructive trusts indicates the replicative nature of the trusts. Thus, in these doctrines, 
a constructive trust is invariably imposed, which indicates that the remedial response is 
narrow and limited. Because the remedy merely replicates the parties’ primary rights and 
duties which have arisen pre-trial, judges never pause to consider whether a lesser 
remedy would be more appropriate. 
                                                                    
123 Re Sharpe (a bankrupt) [1980] 1 W.L.R. 219, 225; Lonrho plc v Fayed (No. 2) [1992] 1 W.L.R. 1, 9; Re Goldcorp Exchange 
Ltd. (in receivership) [1995] 1 A.C. 74; Re Polly Peck International plc (in administration) (No. 2) [1998] 3 All E.R. 812 at 827, 
831; Ultraframe (UK) Ltd. v Fielding [2005] EWHC 1638 (Ch) at [1515], [1546]; Turner v Jacob [2006] EWHC 1317 (Ch) at 
[85]; De Bruyne v De Bruyne [2010] EWCA Civ 519 at [47]–[48]; Sinclair Investments (UK) Ltd. v Versailles Trade Finance Ltd. 
(in administrative receivership) [2011] EWCA Civ 347 at [37]; Crossco No. 4 Unlimited v Jolan Ltd. [2011] EWCA Civ 1619 at 
[84]; FHR European Ventures LLP v Cedar Capital Partners LLC [2014] UKSC 45 at [47]. 
124 London Allied Holdings Ltd. v Lee [2007] EWHC 2061 (Ch) at [273]; Crossco No. 4 Unlimited v Jolan Ltd. [2011] EWCA 
Civ 1619 at [84]. 
125 Lonrho plc v Fayed (No. 2) [1992] 1 WLR 1, 9; London Allied Holdings Ltd. v Lee [2007] EWHC 2061 (Ch) at [273]. 
126 Re Goldcorp Exchange Ltd. (in receivership) [1995] 1 A.C. 74, 104. 
127 Re Polly Peck International plc (in administration) (No. 2) [1998] 3 All E.R. 812, 831. 
128 Neuberger, “The Remedial Constructive Trust — Fact or Fiction”, at [26]: “property rights are a matter of strict law 
not discretion.” 
129 London Allied Holdings Ltd. v Lee [2007] EWHC 2061 (Ch) at [273]. 
130 See Section II above. 
131 Paragon Finance plc v DB Thakerar & Co. [1999] 1 All E.R. 400, 409. 
132 Coulthard v Disco Mix Club Ltd. [2000] 1 WLR 707 (Ch) at 731. 
133 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington L.B.C. [1996] A.C. 669, 714. 
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B. “Remedial” Constructive Trusts 
 
On the other hand, both reflective and transformative constructive trusts display 
characteristics of discretion and retrospectivity, and therefore they both map on to the 
present understanding of “remedial” constructive trusts. 
 
1. As Reflective Remedies 
 
Proprietary estoppel allows judges to exercise remedial discretion to give effect to A’s 
secondary right, by which a backdated constructive trust might be imposed. Hence, this 
doctrine can be understood as providing for the imposition of “remedial” constructive 
trusts. As Etherton J. (as he then was) observed, proprietary estoppel provides for the 
imposition of:134  
 
a constructive trust by way of discretionary ... relief, the right to which is a mere 
equity prior to judgment, but which will have priority over intervening rights of 
third parties on established principles, such as those relating to notice, volunteers 
and the unconscionability on the facts of a claim by the third party to priority.  
 
These constructive trusts are, however, distinct from those imposed as replicative 
or transformative remedies. Unlike replicative constructive trust doctrines where B must 
always perform his promise because he is invariably bound to honour his pre-existing 
trust relationship with A, here it is less obvious that B should be compelled to carry out 
the entirety of his promise whenever A suffers a reliance loss. There can be various 
degrees of detriment suffered and expectations formed; and “[i]t is clear … that these 
elements are fact sensitive and hugely dependent on the context”.135 The exercise of 
discretion is therefore essential. At the same time, they are distinct from those awarded 
as transformative remedies. It is clear that the fundamental object of proprietary estoppel 
is the correction of reliance losses,136 or “harm”, as Spence calls it. By “seek[ing] to react 
to multiple considerations”,137 proprietary estoppel provides for the exercise of remedial 
discretion in order to tailor the content of the remedy to achieve the goal of 
compensation. Hence, unlike transformative constructive trusts, discretion is not 
exercised as to the goal of the remedy. 
 
2. As Transformative Remedies 
 
As a remedy which significantly transforms A’s pre-trial rights, the “remedial 
constructive trust” device as developed in Commonwealth jurisdictions such as Australia 
and Canada allows for the exercise of discretion which goes beyond that provided for 
under English law. The ability to exercise discretion both as to the goal and content of 
the appropriate remedy indicates that courts are concerned with the redistribution of 
property rights to reflect various policy aims. Hence, this device can potentially be 
imposed in any case and “whatever the field of private law involved”.138  
 It is necessary to consider and dismiss two types of observations which might be 
                                                                    
134 London Allied Holdings Ltd. v Lee [2007] EWHC 2061 (Ch). 
135 Aspden v Elvy [2012] EWHC 1387 (Ch) at [99]. 
136 Gardner, “Reliance-Based Constructive Trusts”, p. 79. See also Wilken and Ghaly: The Law of Waiver, Variation, and 
Estoppel, para. [11.94]: “The prime aim of the discretion [in proprietary estoppel] should be to prevent detriment.” 
137 Simon Gardner, “The Remedial Discretion in Proprietary Estoppel – Again” (2006) 122 L.Q.R. 492, 507. 
138  Donovan Waters, “The Constructive Trust: Two Theses — England and Wales, and Canada” 
<http://www.step.org/constructive-trust-two-theses-%E2%80%93-england-and-wales-and-canada>. 
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taken to suggest that transformative constructive trusts have a place in English law. The 
first is based on the observations that the “remedial constructive trust” device as 
developed in those Commonwealth jurisdictions may have the object of attaining “the 
minimum equity to grant a proprietary remedy” 139  or achieving “fairness or good 
conscience”.140 It might be argued that, if either of these serves as the fixed “goal” of the 
remedy, then discretion as to goal is not after all exercised, which leads to the conclusion 
that the “remedial constructive trust” device is, after all, imposed as reflective remedies 
in reality. 
Such a view ought to be resisted. It is first necessary to recall that the “minimum 
equity” approach, on its own, indicates that discretion is exercised only as to content and 
not as to goal. It dictates that equity’s intervention ought to be the least invasive possible 
to achieve a particular goal; it says nothing about what goal ought to be achieved. So, for 
example, a “minimum equity” approach might be taken in pursuit of the goal of 
punishment, or compensation, or equitable redistribution of property rights: the choice 
of the goal remains at the courts’ discretion. Similarly, “fairness” and “good conscience” 
are not precise enough to act as the goal of the appropriate remedy. This is easily 
demonstrated by the fact that any court order aims to do justice, to achieve fairness, and 
to accord with good conscience; it leaves open the particular purpose(s) or object(s) for 
which a transformative constructive trust is imposed.  
The second type of observation suggests that all constructive trusts are in fact 
remedial in nature, and therefore there is nothing unique about replicative constructive 
trusts, since even these can be recast as transformative in nature. For example, Keith 
Mason writing extra-judicially observes that, even where events trigger the availability of 
(replicative) constructive trusts, “a stern drill-sergeant roars out ‘WAIT FOR IT’ … A 
full-blown proprietary remedy will only be granted if truly necessary and appropriate.”141 
Similarly, R.P. Austin writes that “a proprietary remedy should not ever be regarded as 
mandatory. It should be possible for a court to exercise discretion against decreeing 
proprietary relief if the circumstances suggest that it would be unwise to do so.”142 Along 
the same vein, Michael Bryan suggests that “the alternative of ordering personal relief 
must always be considered, and choice exercised according to flexible but structured 
criteria.”143 
It would be a distortion of the law to deconstruct constructive trusts in this way. 
Whatever the historical position may have been,144 it is an accurate observation of the 
modern law that no discretion as to goal and content is exercised in relation to the award 
of replicative constructive trusts. The fact that the law deems the parties’ primary rights 
and duties as worthy of being enforced negates the need for courts to exercise discretion 
as to the goal of the remedy, and the content of the remedy is determined simply by 
direct reference to those rights and duties. Allowing even a residual possibility of 
considering afresh the goal and content of replicative constructive trusts on a case-by-
case basis is not only unnecessary, but is also liable to cause contradictions and 
confusion. Moreover, it would detract from the full meaning of having rights at law. Since 
courts are prepared to say, in the context of the doctrine in Rochefoucauld v Boustead and 
secret trusts, that informally declared trusts will be enforced as constructive trusts, then 
                                                                    
139 David Wright, “Third Parties and the Australian Remedial Constructive Trust” (2013 – 2014) 37 University of 
Western Australia Law Review 31, 48. 
140 Waters, “The Constructive Trust: Two Theses — England and Wales, and Canada”, p. 1. 
141 Keith Mason, “Deconstructing Constructive Trusts in Australia” (2010) 4 Journal of Equity 1, 45. 
142 RP Austin, “Constructive Trusts” in PD Finn (ed.), Essays in Equity (London 1985), 240. 
143 Michael Bryan, “Constructive Trusts: Understanding Remedialism” in Jamie Glister and Pauline Ridge, Fault Lines in 
Equity (Oxford 2012), 235. 
144 In Muschinski v Dodds (1985) 160 C.L.R. 583, 450–51, Deane J took the view that, since constructive trusts were 
historically “remedial”, and because the law in Australia had not outgrown its formative stages, therefore all 
constructive trusts in the modern law remained “remedial” in nature. 
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beneficiaries under such trusts have rights enforceable as against their trustees which are 
similar in this respect to rights of beneficiaries under express trusts. To hold that courts 
may yet exercise discretion to deprive beneficiaries under such constructive trusts of their 
rights would suggest that courts may also do so in relation to beneficiaries under any 
trust. This would in turn cast doubt as to whether beneficiaries have rights at all. 
 
3. Evaluation 
 
Because the present understanding of “remedial” constructive trusts does not take into 
account the distinction between reflective and transformative constructive trusts, this 
leads to the unfortunate exaggeration that “remedial constructive trust[s are] not part of 
English law”. 145  The source of the problem is an exaggerated notion of remedial 
discretion, which fails to recognise that different degrees and dimensions of discretion are 
exercised in relation to “remedial” constructive trusts. It has been explained that 
reflective remedies provide for the exercise of discretion as to content, while 
transformative remedies allow for the exercise of discretion as to both content and goal. 
The former gives effect to secondary rights, while the latter has little to do with pre-
existing substantive rights. Once this distinction is appreciated, then it becomes clear that 
it is transformative constructive trusts which are not part of English law. 
It is obvious that the imposition of transformative constructive trusts is far more 
contentious than the imposition of reflective constructive trusts, since the former has the 
potential of leading to the unbridled exercise of judicial discretion. This is not an issue in 
relation to reflective constructive trusts because the exercise of discretion is constrained 
in terms of the goal of the remedy. Thus, although proprietary estoppel provides for the 
exercise of remedial discretion, its exercise is constrained by the remedial goal of 
compensating A for harm suffered through the unreliability of B’s induced assumptions. 
This is why the exercise of discretion and the retrospective effect of a constructive trust 
award do not cause any uncertainty in this doctrine: it is precisely because proprietary 
estoppel remedies give effect to the claimant’s substantive rights that we can confidently 
state the choices and constraints on the courts’ exercise of discretion, as well as predict 
with reasonable certainty the possible outcome of any particular case. This also explains 
why it is demonstrably untrue that the ability to vary proprietary rights can only be 
granted by an Act of Parliament: as proprietary estoppel indicates, English courts are able 
to do so in a controlled manner, that is, where the exercise of discretion is constrained as 
to the goal of the remedy. 
 
 
VI. THE WAY FORWARD 
 
It remains to be considered what implications this restructured understanding has for the 
future development of the law. In the first place, it refines the nub of what really troubles 
English judges. It has been seen that the presence of remedial discretion and 
retrospectivity in the award of constructive trusts does not necessarily cause uncertainty 
or reflect a lack of proper principle. Instead, the nub of the concern seems to be the 
ability to exercise unconstrained or unbridled discretion. English courts are perfectly 
comfortable with exercising remedial discretion where the goal of the remedy constrains 
the exercise of such discretion, as proprietary estoppel indicates, but not where the 
discretion is “at large”.  
                                                                    
145 FHR European Ventures LLP v Cedar Capital Partners LLC [2014] UKSC 45 at [47]. 
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The recognition of this fact has important implications for the future 
development of constructive trusts. Instead of considering whether discretion ought to be 
exercised, a proper discussion would focus on how best to constrain the exercise of 
remedial discretion. In this regard, it is apt to note that restricting the goal of the remedy 
for a particular doctrine is not the only possible means of meeting the desire to avoid the 
exercise of unbridled discretion. Thus, even in Australia 146  and Canada 147  where 
transformative constructive trusts are imposed, the apex courts have rejected Lord 
Denning’s “constructive trust of a new model” which can be imposed “whenever justice 
and good conscience require it”,148 since using this as the sole criterion would entail that 
judicial discretion is constrained by no other consideration whatsoever. Instead, they have 
highlighted the need for an incremental development of the law, emphasising that they 
will be “informed by the situations where constructive trusts have been recognized in the 
past.”149 This indicates that, although transformative constructive trusts allow for the 
exercise of discretion as to the goal of the remedy, the doctrine of precedent provides a 
control mechanism which militates against the concerns over an unbridled exercise of 
discretion.  
Hence, the crucial question for English courts is this: ought the law recognise 
transformative constructive trusts which provide the possibility for courts to depart from 
precedent, although this is very unlikely to occur? Put in this way, it is not immediately 
obvious that the answer ought to be a resounding “no”, since allowing for the ability to 
award transformative constructive trusts may provide a desirable balance between 
certainty and flexibility in the award of proprietary remedies.  
 
                                                                    
146 See e.g. Muschinski v Dodds (1985) 160 C.L.R. 583, 452. 
147 See e.g. Pettkus v Becker [1980] 2 S.C.R. 834, 859. 
148 Hussey v Palmer [1972] 1 W.L.R. 1286, 1290. 
149 Soulos v Korkontzilas [1997] 2 S.C.R. 217 at [34]. See too Baumgartner v Baumgartner (1987) 76 A.L.R. 75, 87. 
